Function and feeling machines: A defense of the philosophical conception of subjective experience

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 166, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 349-361

  Buckwalter, Wesley ^a   Phelan, Mark ^b  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Experimental philosophy; Function; Mental state attribution; Phenomenal consciousness; Philosophy of mind; Subjective experience

Indexed keywords

EID: 84885800666     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-0039-9     Document Type: Article

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