Mathematics and democracy: Designing better voting and fair-division procedures

Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-373

  Brams, Steven J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84924208974     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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