The paradox of multiple elections

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 211-236

  Brams, Steven J ^a   Kilgour, D Marc ^b   Zwicker, William S ^c  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^c UNION COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032365096     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050101     Document Type: Article

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