The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 615-627

  Sertel, Murat R ^a,b   Yilmaz, Bilge ^c  

^a BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

^b Turkish Academy of Sciences   (Turkey)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033437807     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050164     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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