Ensuring pareto optimality by referendum voting

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 211-219

  Özkal Sanver, Ipek ^a   Sanver, M Remzi ^a  

^a ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947616714     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0101-7     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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8. Brams SJ, Kilgour DM, Sanver MR (2004) A minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties. In: Matti Wiberg (ed). Reasoned choices: essays in honor of Academy Professor Hannu Nurmi. The Finnish Political Science Association, pp. 108-139
9. Kilgour DM (1997) Separable and nonseparable preferences in multiple referenda. Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University (in press)
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11. May K (1952) A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision. Econometrica 20:680-684
12. Woeginger G (2003) A new characterization of the majority rule. Econ Lett 81:89-94