Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 51, Issue 2 SPEC. ISS., 2005, Pages 464-489

  Meirowitz, Adam ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Downsian competition; Elections; Information revelation; Polling; Signaling games; Voting theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 18644374209     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.015     Document Type: Article

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