Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 627-649

  Warwick, Paul V ^a   Druckman, James N ^b  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0348050780     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123401000242     Document Type: Article

References (60)

1. Eric C. Browne and Mark N. Franklin, ’Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 67 (1973), 453-69.
2. Examples include David P. Baron and John Ferejohn, ’Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures’, American Economic Review, 77 (1987), 303-9; David P. Baron and John Ferejohn, ’Bargaining in Legislatures’, American Political Science Review, 83 (1989), 1181-206; and Joseph E. Harrington Jr, ’The Power of the Proposal Maker in a Model of Endogenous Agenda Formation’, Public Choice, 64 (1990), 1-20.
3. Examples include David P. Baron and John Ferejohn, ’Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures’, American Economic Review, 77 (1987), 303-9; David P. Baron and John Ferejohn, ’Bargaining in Legislatures’, American Political Science Review, 83 (1989), 1181-206; and Joseph E. Harrington Jr, ’The Power of the Proposal Maker in a Model of Endogenous Agenda Formation’, Public Choice, 64 (1990), 1-20.
4. Examples include David P. Baron and John Ferejohn, ’Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures’, American Economic Review, 77 (1987), 303-9; David P. Baron and John Ferejohn, ’Bargaining in Legislatures’, American Political Science Review, 83 (1989), 1181-206; and Joseph E. Harrington Jr, ’The Power of the Proposal Maker in a Model of Endogenous Agenda Formation’, Public Choice, 64 (1990), 1-20.
5. Baron and Ferejohn, ’Bargaining in Legislatures’, p. 1194.
6. Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
7. William A. Gamson, ’A Theory of Coalition Formation,’ American Sociological Review, 26 (1961), p. 376.
8. Browne and Franklin, ’Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies’.
9. Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 171.
10. Massimo Morelli, ’Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining’, American Political Science Review, 93 (1999), 809-20.
11. Browne and Franklin labelled it the ’relative weakness effect’; we prefer the term ’small-party bias’ because it is more descriptive of the nature of the effect.
12. Technically, the formateur is the individual who leads negotiations and is expected to be the prime minister. However, we use the term to refer to the formateur’s party since it is the party, not the individual, that makes the sacrifice (or captures the excess under the other interpretation) in portfolio benefits.
13. In our dataset, covering approximately forty-five years of coalitions in twelve West European countries, the formateur is the largest party in 84 per cent of the governments.
14. Browne and Franklin, ’Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies’, pp. 461-3.
15. Eric C. Browne and John P. Frendreis, ’Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations’, American Journal of Political Science, 24 (1980), 753-68, show that Browne and Franklin’s findings are robust to using a step function instead of linear regression, and that the proportionality norm and the small- party bias apply not only to the distribution of all ministries but also to the distribution of a subset of seemingly desirable ministries (cf., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ’Coalition Payoffs and Electoral Performance in European Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, 72 (1979), 61-81). Norman Schofield and Michael Laver, ’Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-83’, British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 143-64, replicate Browne and Franklin’s analysis and show that a measure of bargaining power (instead of seat share) does not do a better job of predicting allocations, except in multipolar systems. Other recent work on different aspects of portfolios includes David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, ’Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios’, American Political Science Review, 84 (1990), 891-906; Laver and Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments; John D Huber, ’How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 577-91; and Michael F. Thies, ’Keeping Tabs on One’s Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Formation’, American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming 2001.
16. Eric C. Browne and John P. Frendreis, ’Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations’, American Journal of Political Science, 24 (1980), 753-68, show that Browne and Franklin’s findings are robust to using a step function instead of linear regression, and that the proportionality norm and the small- party bias apply not only to the distribution of all ministries but also to the distribution of a subset of seemingly desirable ministries (cf., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ’Coalition Payoffs and Electoral Performance in European Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, 72 (1979), 61-81). Norman Schofield and Michael Laver, ’Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-83’, British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 143-64, replicate Browne and Franklin’s analysis and show that a measure of bargaining power (instead of seat share) does not do a better job of predicting allocations, except in multipolar systems. Other recent work on different aspects of portfolios includes David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, ’Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios’, American Political Science Review, 84 (1990), 891-906; Laver and Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments; John D Huber, ’How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 577-91; and Michael F. Thies, ’Keeping Tabs on One’s Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Formation’, American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming 2001.
17. Eric C. Browne and John P. Frendreis, ’Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations’, American Journal of Political Science, 24 (1980), 753-68, show that Browne and Franklin’s findings are robust to using a step function instead of linear regression, and that the proportionality norm and the small- party bias apply not only to the distribution of all ministries but also to the distribution of a subset of seemingly desirable ministries (cf., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ’Coalition Payoffs and Electoral Performance in European Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, 72 (1979), 61-81). Norman Schofield and Michael Laver, ’Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-83’, British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 143-64, replicate Browne and Franklin’s analysis and show that a measure of bargaining power (instead of seat share) does not do a better job of predicting allocations, except in multipolar systems. Other recent work on different aspects of portfolios includes David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, ’Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios’, American Political Science Review, 84 (1990), 891-906; Laver and Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments; John D Huber, ’How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 577-91; and Michael F. Thies, ’Keeping Tabs on One’s Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Formation’, American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming 2001.
18. Eric C. Browne and John P. Frendreis, ’Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations’, American Journal of Political Science, 24 (1980), 753-68, show that Browne and Franklin’s findings are robust to using a step function instead of linear regression, and that the proportionality norm and the small- party bias apply not only to the distribution of all ministries but also to the distribution of a subset of seemingly desirable ministries (cf., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ’Coalition Payoffs and Electoral Performance in European Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, 72 (1979), 61-81). Norman Schofield and Michael Laver, ’Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-83’, British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 143-64, replicate Browne and Franklin’s analysis and show that a measure of bargaining power (instead of seat share) does not do a better job of predicting allocations, except in multipolar systems. Other recent work on different aspects of portfolios includes David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, ’Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios’, American Political Science Review, 84 (1990), 891-906; Laver and Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments; John D Huber, ’How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 577-91; and Michael F. Thies, ’Keeping Tabs on One’s Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Formation’, American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming 2001.
19. Eric C. Browne and John P. Frendreis, ’Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations’, American Journal of Political Science, 24 (1980), 753-68, show that Browne and Franklin’s findings are robust to using a step function instead of linear regression, and that the proportionality norm and the small- party bias apply not only to the distribution of all ministries but also to the distribution of a subset of seemingly desirable ministries (cf., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ’Coalition Payoffs and Electoral Performance in European Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, 72 (1979), 61-81). Norman Schofield and Michael Laver, ’Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-83’, British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 143-64, replicate Browne and Franklin’s analysis and show that a measure of bargaining power (instead of seat share) does not do a better job of predicting allocations, except in multipolar systems. Other recent work on different aspects of portfolios includes David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, ’Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios’, American Political Science Review, 84 (1990), 891-906; Laver and Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments; John D Huber, ’How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 577-91; and Michael F. Thies, ’Keeping Tabs on One’s Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Formation’, American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming 2001.
20. Eric C. Browne and John P. Frendreis, ’Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations’, American Journal of Political Science, 24 (1980), 753-68, show that Browne and Franklin’s findings are robust to using a step function instead of linear regression, and that the proportionality norm and the small- party bias apply not only to the distribution of all ministries but also to the distribution of a subset of seemingly desirable ministries (cf., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ’Coalition Payoffs and Electoral Performance in European Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, 72 (1979), 61-81). Norman Schofield and Michael Laver, ’Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-83’, British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 143-64, replicate Browne and Franklin’s analysis and show that a measure of bargaining power (instead of seat share) does not do a better job of predicting allocations, except in multipolar systems. Other recent work on different aspects of portfolios includes David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, ’Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios’, American Political Science Review, 84 (1990), 891-906; Laver and Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments; John D Huber, ’How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 577-91; and Michael F. Thies, ’Keeping Tabs on One’s Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Formation’, American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming 2001.
21. Eric C. Browne and John P. Frendreis, ’Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations’, American Journal of Political Science, 24 (1980), 753-68, show that Browne and Franklin’s findings are robust to using a step function instead of linear regression, and that the proportionality norm and the small- party bias apply not only to the distribution of all ministries but also to the distribution of a subset of seemingly desirable ministries (cf., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ’Coalition Payoffs and Electoral Performance in European Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, 72 (1979), 61-81). Norman Schofield and Michael Laver, ’Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-83’, British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 143-64, replicate Browne and Franklin’s analysis and show that a measure of bargaining power (instead of seat share) does not do a better job of predicting allocations, except in multipolar systems. Other recent work on different aspects of portfolios includes David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, ’Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios’, American Political Science Review, 84 (1990), 891-906; Laver and Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments; John D Huber, ’How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 577-91; and Michael F. Thies, ’Keeping Tabs on One’s Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Formation’, American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming 2001.
22. Baron and Ferejohn, ’Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures’ and ’Bargaining in Legislatures’. The basic structure of the model has been widely applied (e.g., David P. Baron, ’Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 593-609; Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen, ’Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 611-21), and has been identified as a ’common reference point’ for non-cooperative office-seeking models of coalition formation (Morelli, ’Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining’, p. 809). Although Baron and Ferejohn (’Bargaining in Legislatures’, pp. 1193-5) examine legislative bargaining under an open and a closed rule, we focus on the closed rule model with infinite sessions, as this is the model more analogous to coalition bargaining.
23. Baron and Ferejohn, ’Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures’ and ’Bargaining in Legislatures’. The basic structure of the model has been widely applied (e.g., David P. Baron, ’Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 593-609; Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen, ’Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 611-21), and has been identified as a ’common reference point’ for non-cooperative office-seeking models of coalition formation (Morelli, ’Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining’, p. 809). Although Baron and Ferejohn (’Bargaining in Legislatures’, pp. 1193-5) examine legislative bargaining under an open and a closed rule, we focus on the closed rule model with infinite sessions, as this is the model more analogous to coalition bargaining.
24. Baron and Ferejohn, ’Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures’ and ’Bargaining in Legislatures’. The basic structure of the model has been widely applied (e.g., David P. Baron, ’Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 593-609; Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen, ’Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 611-21), and has been identified as a ’common reference point’ for non-cooperative office-seeking models of coalition formation (Morelli, ’Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining’, p. 809). Although Baron and Ferejohn (’Bargaining in Legislatures’, pp. 1193-5) examine legislative bargaining under an open and a closed rule, we focus on the closed rule model with infinite sessions, as this is the model more analogous to coalition bargaining.
25. Baron and Ferejohn, ’Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures’ and ’Bargaining in Legislatures’. The basic structure of the model has been widely applied (e.g., David P. Baron, ’Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 593-609; Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen, ’Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 611-21), and has been identified as a ’common reference point’ for non-cooperative office-seeking models of coalition formation (Morelli, ’Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining’, p. 809). Although Baron and Ferejohn (’Bargaining in Legislatures’, pp. 1193-5) examine legislative bargaining under an open and a closed rule, we focus on the closed rule model with infinite sessions, as this is the model more analogous to coalition bargaining.
26. Baron and Ferejohn, ’Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures’ and ’Bargaining in Legislatures’. The basic structure of the model has been widely applied (e.g., David P. Baron, ’Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 593-609; Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen, ’Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 611-21), and has been identified as a ’common reference point’ for non-cooperative office-seeking models of coalition formation (Morelli, ’Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining’, p. 809). Although Baron and Ferejohn (’Bargaining in Legislatures’, pp. 1193-5) examine legislative bargaining under an open and a closed rule, we focus on the closed rule model with infinite sessions, as this is the model more analogous to coalition bargaining.
27. Baron and Ferejohn, ’Bargaining in Legislatures’, pp. 1193-4. Subsequent related models, such as those of Baron, ’Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’ and Diermeier and Fedderson, ’Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, see benefits in terms of government income to be used to reward supporters. However, they assume that the ability to reward supporters depends on holding (cabinet) office (e.g., Baron, ’Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’, p. 598).
28. Baron and Ferejohn, ’Bargaining in Legislatures’, pp. 1193-4. Subsequent related models, such as those of Baron, ’Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’ and Diermeier and Fedderson, ’Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, see benefits in terms of government income to be used to reward supporters. However, they assume that the ability to reward supporters depends on holding (cabinet) office (e.g., Baron, ’Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’, p. 598).
29. Baron and Ferejohn, ’Bargaining in Legislatures’, pp. 1193-4. Subsequent related models, such as those of Baron, ’Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’ and Diermeier and Fedderson, ’Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, see benefits in terms of government income to be used to reward supporters. However, they assume that the ability to reward supporters depends on holding (cabinet) office (e.g., Baron, ’Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’, p. 598).
30. Baron and Ferejohn, ’Bargaining in Legislatures’, pp. 1193-4. Subsequent related models, such as those of Baron, ’Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’ and Diermeier and Fedderson, ’Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, see benefits in terms of government income to be used to reward supporters. However, they assume that the ability to reward supporters depends on holding (cabinet) office (e.g., Baron, ’Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’, p. 598).
31. The discount factor simply registers the extent to which a party would prefer to enter a government in the present round of the game, rather than waiting for the next round of the game (other things being equal).
32. Baron and Ferejohn, ’Bargaining in Legislatures’, p. 1193.
33. Under certain assumptions about how formateurs are selected, such as the assumption that the probability of selection is proportional to seat shares, the expected or ex ante distribution of payoffs can also be proportional to seat shares. However, portfolios are distributed ex post, that is, after the formateur has been selected. At this stage, the formateur is in a position to extract a disproportionately large share of payoffs.
34. Morelli, ’Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining’.
35. Morelli also includes a policy component in each party’s utility function. This generates some interesting dynamics, but is tangential to the question of portfolio allocation and we do not discuss it further.
36. Morelli, ’Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining’, p. 810.
37. The existence of differences in portfolio saliences has been widely recognized. Laver and Schofield, Multiparty Government, pp. 181-2, for example, suggest that it is conventional to see the prime ministership as the top portfolio, followed by a tier of senior portfolios, and two lower tiers of portfolios. Eric C. Browne and Karen A. Feste, ’Qualitative Dimensions of Coalition Payoffs: Evidence for European Party Governments 1945-70’, American Behavioral Scientist, 18 (1975), 530-56, find that a plausible ordering of portfolios can be established by examining how often portfolios are held by the largest and therefore most influential party. Ian Budge and Hans Keman, Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), point out that portfolio preferences may vary across parties and investigate how certain types of parties prefer particular portfolios (e.g., agrarian parties prefer the agriculture portfolio). The important point to note, however, is that no studies incorporate portfolio salience weights in a cross-national statistical analysis of coalition payoffs.
38. The existence of differences in portfolio saliences has been widely recognized. Laver and Schofield, Multiparty Government, pp. 181-2, for example, suggest that it is conventional to see the prime ministership as the top portfolio, followed by a tier of senior portfolios, and two lower tiers of portfolios. Eric C. Browne and Karen A. Feste, ’Qualitative Dimensions of Coalition Payoffs: Evidence for European Party Governments 1945-70’, American Behavioral Scientist, 18 (1975), 530-56, find that a plausible ordering of portfolios can be established by examining how often portfolios are held by the largest and therefore most influential party. Ian Budge and Hans Keman, Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), point out that portfolio preferences may vary across parties and investigate how certain types of parties prefer particular portfolios (e.g., agrarian parties prefer the agriculture portfolio). The important point to note, however, is that no studies incorporate portfolio salience weights in a cross-national statistical analysis of coalition payoffs.
39. The existence of differences in portfolio saliences has been widely recognized. Laver and Schofield, Multiparty Government, pp. 181-2, for example, suggest that it is conventional to see the prime ministership as the top portfolio, followed by a tier of senior portfolios, and two lower tiers of portfolios. Eric C. Browne and Karen A. Feste, ’Qualitative Dimensions of Coalition Payoffs: Evidence for European Party Governments 1945-70’, American Behavioral Scientist, 18 (1975), 530-56, find that a plausible ordering of portfolios can be established by examining how often portfolios are held by the largest and therefore most influential party. Ian Budge and Hans Keman, Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), point out that portfolio preferences may vary across parties and investigate how certain types of parties prefer particular portfolios (e.g., agrarian parties prefer the agriculture portfolio). The important point to note, however, is that no studies incorporate portfolio salience weights in a cross-national statistical analysis of coalition payoffs.
40. The countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and West Germany. Systems that are not fully parliamentary, such as the French Fifth Republic, were excluded so that institutional differences do not influence the results.
41. Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge, ’Political Data 1945-1990: Party Government in 20 Democracies’, European Journal of Political Research, 24 (1993), 1-120; Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge, ’Party Government in 20 Democracies: An Update (1990-1995)’, European Journal of Political Research, 33 (1998), 125-64
42. Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge, ’Political Data 1945-1990: Party Government in 20 Democracies’, European Journal of Political Research, 24 (1993), 1-120; Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge, ’Party Government in 20 Democracies: An Update (1990-1995)’, European Journal of Political Research, 33 (1998), 125-64
43. Woldendorp, Keman and Budge, ’Political Data 1945-1990’, p. 5.
44. We do not employ the measure of bargaining power used by Schofield and Laver (’Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-83’, pp. 154-8), because they find that seat contribution is the best overall predictor. Also, note that measures of seat contribution and bargaining power tend to be highly related (Morelli, ’Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining’, p. 810).
45. We do not employ the measure of bargaining power used by Schofield and Laver (’Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-83’, pp. 154-8), because they find that seat contribution is the best overall predictor. Also, note that measures of seat contribution and bargaining power tend to be highly related (Morelli, ’Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining’, p. 810).
46. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (London: Keesing’s Publications, 1945-90).
47. Michael Laver and W. Ben Hunt, Policy and Party Competition (New York: Routledge, 1992). It is worth noting that they collected these data with an eye towards the type of exercise that we are undertaking here (p. 105).
48. This was a major finding in Budge and Keman, Parties and Democracy.
49. An extension of the LH rankings is provided in Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm (eds), Regierungskoalitionen in Westeuropa (Vienna: Signum Verlag, 1997). We chose not to use these extended rankings because the additional information consists of the ranking of minor portfolios (and thus the distinctions are not likely to be clear cut) and are based on the judgement of only one or two experts.
50. Laver and Hunt, Policy and Party Competition, p. 133.
51. It is important not to allow the lowest category to receive this value because to do so would be to create enormous disparities in portfolio values. If portfolios are ranked from 1 to 15, for example, it would mean that the top portfolio (the prime ministership) is fifteen times as valuable as the bottom portfolios (which include all unranked portfolios) - which seems rather unlikely.
52. Browne and Franklin, ’Aspects of Coalition Payoffs’, p. 460.
53. 2 of 0.855, the slope relating seat contribution to portfolio shares in their data would be 0.799, very similar to the one reported here.
54. Browne and Frendreis, ’Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm’, p. 758.
55. Browne and Franklin, ’Aspects of Coalition Payoffs’, p. 463.
56. The estimated regression coefficients are a = 0.196 and b = 0.608 for two-party coalitions; a = 0.109 and b = 0.671 for three-party coalitions; a = 0.055 and b = 0.780 for four-party coalitions; and a = 0.045 and b = 0.773 for coalitions of five or more parties. All coefficients are significant at p<0.001.
57. 2 values for any of these regressions.
58. 2 values for any of these regressions.
59. Browne and Franklin, ’Aspects of Coalition Payoffs’, p. 464.
60. This figure is calculated by averaging the 407 non-formateur slopes of 1.049 and the 200 formateur slopes of 0.867 (1.049-0.182). Incidentally, further testing shows that a slope that falls slightly below 1.0 could simply be a consequence of the ’lumpiness’ of portfolio allocations.