Critical strategies under approval voting: Who gets ruled in and ruled out

Electoral Studies

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 287-305

  Brams, Steven J ^a   Sanver, M Remzi ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

Approval voting; Condorcet winner loser; Elections; Nash equilibrium; Voting games

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; GAME THEORY; NUMERICAL MODEL; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 33748941267     PISSN: 02613794     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2005.05.007     Document Type: Article

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