A minimax procedure for electing committees

Public Choice

Volumn 132, Issue 3-4, 2007, Pages 401-420

  Brams, Steven J ^a   Kilgour, D Marc ^b   Sanver, M Remzi ^c  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^c ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

Approval balloting; Committee election; Hamming distance; Minimax procedure; Minisum procedure

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547789862     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9165-x     Document Type: Article

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