Multiparty democracy: Elections and legislative politics

Multiparty Democracy: Elections and Legislative Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-225

  Schofield, Norman ^a   Sened, Itai ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924697282     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511617621     Document Type: Book

References (216)

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