Single-peakedness and disconnected coalitions

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 359-383

  Brams, Steven J ^a   Jones, Michael A ^b   Kilgour, D Marc ^c  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MONTCLAIR STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Coalition formation; Dynamic process; Perceptions; Single peakedness; Strange bedfellows

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038171223     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/095169280201400304     Document Type: Review

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