Analyzing a nail-biting election

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 415-430

  Saari, Donald G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035615415     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550100136     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Brams S, Fishburn P (1999) A nail-biting election. Soc Choice Welfare (this issue)
2. Nurmi H (1999) Voting paradoxes and how to deal with them. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York
3. Regenwetter M, Grofman B (1998) Approval voting, Borda winners, and Condorcet winners: Evidence from seven elections, Manag Sci 44: 520-533
4. Saari DG (1994) Geometry of voting. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York
5. Saari DG (1995) Basic geometry of voting. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York
6. Saari DG (1999) Explaining all three alternative voting outcomes. J Econ Theory 87: 313-355
7. Saari DG (2000) Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes 1: pairwise vote, Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes 2: positional voting. Econ Theory 15: 1-103
8. Saari DG (2001) Chaotic elections! A mathematician looks at voting. American Mathematical Society, Providence, R.I.
9. Saari DG (2001) Decisions and elections; Explaining the unexpected. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
10. Saari DG, Sieberg KK (2001) The sum of the parts can violate the whole, To appear, APSR
11. Saari DG, van Newenhizen J (1988) Is approval voting an unmitigated evil? Publ Choice 59: 133-147
12. Tabarrok A (2001) Fundamentals of voting theory illustrated with the 1992 election. Publ Choice 106: 275-297