Borda count versus approval voting: A fuzzy approach

Public Choice

Volumn 112, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 167-184

  García Lapresta, José Luis ^a   Martínez Panero, Miguel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VALLADOLID   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036276643     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1015609200117     Document Type: Article

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