Democracy defended

Democracy Defended

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-483

  Mackie, Gerry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84928854618     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511490293     Document Type: Book

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