Positive political theory I: Collective preference

Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-208

  Austen Smith, David ^a   Banks, Jeffrey S ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

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EID: 85059292326     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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