Models of political economy

Models of Political Economy

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-222

  Nurmi, Hannu ^a,b  

^a ACADEMY OF FINLAND   (Finland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TURKU   (Finland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84909275076     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203358559     Document Type: Book

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