Voting on referenda: The separability problem and possible solutions

Electoral Studies

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 359-377

  Brams, Steven J ^a   Kilgour, D Marc ^b   Zwicker, William S ^c  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^c UNION COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Abstentions; Aggregation methods; Multiple election paradox; Referenda; Separable preferences; Voting procedures

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000074262     PISSN: 02613794     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0261-3794(97)00015-2     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Benoit, J.-P. and Kernhauser, L. A. (1994) Social choice in a representative democracy. American Political Science Review 88, 185-192.
2. Brams, S. J. and Fishburn, P. C. (1983) Approval Voting. Cambridge, MA: Birkhäuser Boston.
3. Brams, S. J. and Fishburn, P. C. (1993) Yes-No voting. Social Choice and Welfare 10, 35-50.
4. Brams, S. J., Kilgour, D. M. and Zwicker, W. S. (1997) The paradox of multiple elections. Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming.
5. Dubin, J. A. and Gerber, E. R. (1992) Patterns of voting on ballot propositions: a mixture model of voter types. Social Science Working Paper 795, California Institute of Technology.
6. Feldmann, S. E. (1995) Legislative bargaining and the initiative. Preprint, Department of Government, Harvard University.
7. Kilgour, D. M. (1997) Separable and non-separable preferences in multiple referenda. Preprint, Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University.
8. Lacy, D. and Niou, E. M. S. (1994) Nonseparable preferences and referendums. Preprint, Department of Political Science, Duke University.