Approval voting with endogenous candidates

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 54, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 47-76

  Dellis, Arnaud ^a   Oak, Mandar P ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII   (United States)

^b WILLIAMS COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Approval voting; Citizen candidate model; Comparison of electoral systems

Indexed keywords

EID: 29944446857     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.010     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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