Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 40-78

  Barbera S ^a   Maschler, M ^b   Shalev, J ^c  

^a UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^c NONE   (Israel)

Author keywords

Clubs; Elections; Equilibrium refinements; Game theory; Noncooperative games; Purestrategy equilibrium profiles; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035185264     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0827     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. "Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games"
2. "Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value"
3. "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game"
4. "Voting by Committees"
5. The stability of hedonic coalition structures, mimeo
6. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability"
7. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability"
8. "Free Mobility and the Optimal Number of Jurisdictions"
9. "On the Stability of Equilibria"
10. "Extensive Games and the Problem of Information"
11. "Stability and Segregation in Group Formation"
12. Dynamic voting in clubs, mimeo
13. "Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games"
14. "On the Dynamics of Standards"
15. "A Model of Declining Standards"