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Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 1-243

Designing democracy: Ideas for better rules

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EID: 84891382694     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/b137964     Document Type: Book
Times cited : (29)

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