A problem with referendums

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 5-31

  Lacy, Dean ^a   Niou, Emerson M S ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Condorcet winner; Nonseparable preferences; Referendums; Sequential voting; Strategic voting; Vote trading

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034388506     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692800012001001     Document Type: Article

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