Perfecting parliament: Constitutional reform, liberalism, and the rise of western democracy

Perfecting Parliament: Constitutional Reform, Liberalism, and the Rise of Western Democracy

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-658

  Congleton, Roger D ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84924012269     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511779251     Document Type: Book

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