Political efficiency and equal protection of the law

Kyklos

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 485-505

  Congleton, Roger D ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 5844277375     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6435.00027     Document Type: Article

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