Parties and Interests in the 'Marriage of Iron and Rye'

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 291-330

  Schonhardt Bailey, Cheryl ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345763161     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0007123498000179     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. Elsewhere I examine a fourth 'statist' interpretation ('Sorting the Wheat from the Chaff: The "Marriage of Iron and Rye" Revisited', unpublished working paper, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1994).
2. Dan S. White, The Splintered Party: National Liberalism in Hessen and the Reich 1867-1918 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 11.
3. Brian L. Goff and Kevin B. Grier, 'On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 5-20; Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, 'The Apparent Ideological Behaviour of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions', Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (1990), 103-32; Kalt and Zupan, 'Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics', American Economic Review, 74 (1984), 279-300; Keith Krehbiel, 'Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 21-38; Sam Peltzman, 'Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting', Journal of Law and Economics, 27 (1984), 181-210; Sam Peltzman, 'An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century', American Economic Review, 75 (1985), 656-75; Keith T. Poole, 'Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the US Congress', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13 (1988), 117-33.
4. Brian L. Goff and Kevin B. Grier, 'On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 5-20; Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, 'The Apparent Ideological Behaviour of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions', Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (1990), 103-32; Kalt and Zupan, 'Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics', American Economic Review, 74 (1984), 279-300; Keith Krehbiel, 'Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 21-38; Sam Peltzman, 'Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting', Journal of Law and Economics, 27 (1984), 181-210; Sam Peltzman, 'An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century', American Economic Review, 75 (1985), 656-75; Keith T. Poole, 'Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the US Congress', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13 (1988), 117-33.
5. Brian L. Goff and Kevin B. Grier, 'On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 5-20; Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, 'The Apparent Ideological Behaviour of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions', Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (1990), 103-32; Kalt and Zupan, 'Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics', American Economic Review, 74 (1984), 279-300; Keith Krehbiel, 'Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 21-38; Sam Peltzman, 'Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting', Journal of Law and Economics, 27 (1984), 181-210; Sam Peltzman, 'An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century', American Economic Review, 75 (1985), 656-75; Keith T. Poole, 'Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the US Congress', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13 (1988), 117-33.
6. Brian L. Goff and Kevin B. Grier, 'On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 5-20; Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, 'The Apparent Ideological Behaviour of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions', Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (1990), 103-32; Kalt and Zupan, 'Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics', American Economic Review, 74 (1984), 279-300; Keith Krehbiel, 'Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 21-38; Sam Peltzman, 'Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting', Journal of Law and Economics, 27 (1984), 181-210; Sam Peltzman, 'An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century', American Economic Review, 75 (1985), 656-75; Keith T. Poole, 'Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the US Congress', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13 (1988), 117-33.
7. Brian L. Goff and Kevin B. Grier, 'On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 5-20; Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, 'The Apparent Ideological Behaviour of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions', Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (1990), 103-32; Kalt and Zupan, 'Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics', American Economic Review, 74 (1984), 279-300; Keith Krehbiel, 'Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 21-38; Sam Peltzman, 'Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting', Journal of Law and Economics, 27 (1984), 181-210; Sam Peltzman, 'An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century', American Economic Review, 75 (1985), 656-75; Keith T. Poole, 'Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the US Congress', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13 (1988), 117-33.
8. Brian L. Goff and Kevin B. Grier, 'On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 5-20; Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, 'The Apparent Ideological Behaviour of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions', Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (1990), 103-32; Kalt and Zupan, 'Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics', American Economic Review, 74 (1984), 279-300; Keith Krehbiel, 'Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 21-38; Sam Peltzman, 'Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting', Journal of Law and Economics, 27 (1984), 181-210; Sam Peltzman, 'An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century', American Economic Review, 75 (1985), 656-75; Keith T. Poole, 'Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the US Congress', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13 (1988), 117-33.
9. Brian L. Goff and Kevin B. Grier, 'On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 5-20; Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, 'The Apparent Ideological Behaviour of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions', Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (1990), 103-32; Kalt and Zupan, 'Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics', American Economic Review, 74 (1984), 279-300; Keith Krehbiel, 'Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 21-38; Sam Peltzman, 'Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting', Journal of Law and Economics, 27 (1984), 181-210; Sam Peltzman, 'An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century', American Economic Review, 75 (1985), 656-75; Keith T. Poole, 'Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the US Congress', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13 (1988), 117-33.
10. Ivo Nikolai Lambi, Free Trade and Protection in Germany 1868-1879 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1963).
11. David Blackboum, 'The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie: Reappraising German History in the Nineteenth Century', in David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, eds, The Peculiarities of German History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Martin Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany 1815-1914 (London: Croom Helm, 1978); Timothy James McKeown, 'The Rise and Decline of the Open Trading Regime of the Nineteenth Century' (doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1982), chap. 8; Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarchzeit (Berlin, 1967).
12. David Blackboum, 'The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie: Reappraising German History in the Nineteenth Century', in David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, eds, The Peculiarities of German History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Martin Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany 1815-1914 (London: Croom Helm, 1978); Timothy James McKeown, 'The Rise and Decline of the Open Trading Regime of the Nineteenth Century' (doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1982), chap. 8; Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarchzeit (Berlin, 1967).
13. David Blackboum, 'The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie: Reappraising German History in the Nineteenth Century', in David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, eds, The Peculiarities of German History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Martin Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany 1815-1914 (London: Croom Helm, 1978); Timothy James McKeown, 'The Rise and Decline of the Open Trading Regime of the Nineteenth Century' (doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1982), chap. 8; Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarchzeit (Berlin, 1967).
14. David Blackboum, 'The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie: Reappraising German History in the Nineteenth Century', in David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, eds, The Peculiarities of German History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Martin Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany 1815-1914 (London: Croom Helm, 1978); Timothy James McKeown, 'The Rise and Decline of the Open Trading Regime of the Nineteenth Century' (doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1982), chap. 8; Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarchzeit (Berlin, 1967).
15. Sarah Rebecca Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck's Fall: The Formation of the Farmers' League (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 74-7.
16. Percy Ashley, Modem Tariff History: Germany-United States-France (London: John Murray, 1920), p. 86.
17. Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck's Fall, pp. 207-47.
18. Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck's Fall, pp. 21, 226-7.
19. Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck's Fall, p. 254. Russian duties were increased seven times between 1881 and 1890, resulting in a large drop in German exports to Russia. In 1891, Russian imports to Germany were subjected to a 50 per cent tariff, while a similar tariff was placed on German imports to Russia (pp. 82-3, 253).