An economic model of representative democracy

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 112, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 85-114

  Besley, Timothy ^a   Coate, Stephen ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRATIC PROCESS; POLICY MAKING; REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0031414212     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355397555136     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Alesina, Alberto, "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, LXXVIII (1988), 796-806.
2. Arrow, Kenneth, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1963).
3. Becker, Gary, "Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs," Journal of Public Economics, XXVIII (1985), 329-47.
4. Bergson, Abram, "Social Choice and Welfare Economics under Representative Government," Journal of Public Economics, VI (1976), 171-190.
5. Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate, "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," typescript, 1996.
6. Buchanan, James M., Public Finance in Democratic Process (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967).
7. Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper Collins, 1957).
8. Feddersen, Timothy J., "A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout," American Journal of Political Science, XXXVI (1992), 938-62.
9. Feddersen, Timothy J., Itai Sened, and Stephen G. Wright, "Rational Voting and Candidate Entry under Plurality Rule," American Journal of Political Science, XXXIV (1990), 1005-16.
10. Harsanyi, John, "Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points," International Journal of Game Theory, II (1973), 1-23.
11. Hurwicz, Leonid, and David Schmeidler, "Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, XLVI (1978), 1447-74.
12. Myerson, Roger B., "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption," Games and Economic Behavior, V (1993), 118-32.
13. Myerson, Roger B., and Robert J. Weber, "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," American Political Science Review, LXXVII (1993), 102-14.
14. Nash, John, "Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, XXXVI (1950), 48-49.
15. Osborne, Martin J., "Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take," Canadian Journal of Economics, XXVIII (1995), 261-301.
16. Osborne, Martin J., and Al Slivinski, "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen Candidates," Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXI (1996), 65-96.
17. Palfrey, Thomas R., "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," Review of Economic Studies, LI (1984), 139-56.
18. Rogoff, Kenneth, "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, LXXX (1990), 21-36.
19. Stigler, George, "Economists and Public Policy," Regulation (May/June 1982), 7-13.
20. Stiglitz, Joseph E., "The Demand for Education in Public and Private Schools," Journal of Public Economics, III (1974), 349-85.