Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance

Public Choice

Volumn 132, Issue 3-4, 2007, Pages 333-352

  Congleton, Roger D ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Delegation; Effectiveness of democracy; Elections; Expert's dilemma; Information aggregation; Informational policies; Jury theorem; Liberal institutions; Majority rule; Rational ignorance; Simulated elections; Yardstick competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547790869     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9155-z     Document Type: Article

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