Efficient mercantilism? Revenue-maximizing monopoly policies as Ramsey taxation

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 102-114

  Congleton, Roger D ^a   Lee, Sanghack ^b  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Kookmin University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Anti trust; Corruption; Dictatorship; Encompassing interest; Endogenous rent seeking; Innovation; Interest groups; Leviathan; Mercantilism; Monopoly; Patents; Public choice; Public finance; Regulation; Rent extraction; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 61849171649     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.07.001     Document Type: Article

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