The rise of the modern welfare state, ideology, institutions and income security: Analysis and evidence

Public Choice

Volumn 144, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 535-555

  Congleton, Roger D ^a   Bose, Feler ^b  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b ALMA COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Constitutional choice and institutional analysis; Ideological change; Public choice; Public finance; Public policy; Social insurance; Welfare state

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955093918     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9673-y     Document Type: Article

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