Economic and cultural prerequisites for democracy

Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 44-67

  Congleton, Roger D ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 34547851937     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511510519.004     Document Type: Chapter

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