Help, harm or avoid? On the personal advantage of dispositions to cooperate and punish in multilateral PD games with exit

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 145-167

  Congleton, Roger D ^a   Vanberg, Viktor J ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

A13; C7; Clubs; Cooperation; D6; Economics; Ethics; Evolution; Exit; Game theory; Public goods; Punishment; Sanctions; Simulations; Team production

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041866335     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00159-1     Document Type: Article

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