Public debt and the birth of the democratic state: France and Great Britain, 1688–1789

Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain, 1688-1789

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-210

  Stasavage, David ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84926143282     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511510557     Document Type: Book

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