Two views on institutions and development: The grand transition vs the primacy of institutions

Kyklos

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 65-100

  Paldam, Martin ^a   Gundlach, Erich ^b  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

^b KIEL INSTITUTE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT; PROPERTY RIGHTS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 38349068778     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: 14676435     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.2008.00393.x     Document Type: Article

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