Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 364-376

  Wit, Jörgen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000891539     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0596     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Austen-Smith D., Banks J. S. Information Aggregation, Rationality and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 90:1996;34-45.
2. Berg S. Condorcet's Jury Theorem, Dependency Among Jurors. Soc. Choice Welfare. 10:1993;87-95.
3. Feddersen, T. Pesendorfer, W. 1995, Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information, The Center For Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, Evanston.
4. Feddersen T., Pesendorfer W. The Swing Voter's Curse. Amer. Econ. Rev. 86:1996;408-424.
5. Ladha K. The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech and Correlated Votes. Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 36:1992;617-634.
6. Ladha K. Condorcet's Jury Theorem in Light of de Finetti's Theorem. Soc. Choice Welfare. 10:1993;69-85.
7. Ladha, K. Miller, G. Oppenheimer, J. 1996, Democracy: Turbo-charged or Shackled? Information Aggregation by Majority Rule, mimeo, St. Louis, Washington University.
8. McLennan, A. 1996, Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents, mimeo, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota.
9. Myerson R. B. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. 1991;Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge.
10. Myerson, R. B. 1994, Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, The Center For Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, Evanston.