Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: Spite and overdissipation

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 1045-1057

  Hehenkamp, B ^a   Leininger, W ^a   Possajennikov, A ^b  

^a TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Contests; Evolutionary stable strategy; Overdissipation; Spite

Indexed keywords

EID: 4844226881     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.09.002     Document Type: Article

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