Judges and taxes: Judicial review, judicial independence and the size of government

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 5-30

  Tridmas, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ULSTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Judicial independence; Judicial review; Size of government; Taxation

Indexed keywords

EID: 16244414857     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-005-5850-2     Document Type: Review

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