Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history

Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-308

  North, Douglass C ^a   Wallis, John Joseph ^b   Weingast, Barry R ^c  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929735909     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511575839     Document Type: Book

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