Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 63, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 265-286

  Grossman, Gene M ^a   Helpman, Elhanan ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001286236     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2297852     Document Type: Article

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