Motivation crowding theory

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 15, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 589-611

  Frey, Bruno S ^a   Jegen, Reto ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Crowding effect; Economic psychology; Experiments; Intrinsic motivation; Principal agent theory

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY;

EID: 0035212713     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6419.00150     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Akerlof, G. A. (1982) Labor contracts as partial gift exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488-500.
2. Akerlof, G. A. and Dickens, W. (1982) The economic consequences of cognitive dissonance. American Economic Review, 72, 3, 307-319.
3. Akerlof, G. A. and Yellen, J. L. (1986) Efficiency Wage Models and the Labor Market. Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
4. Alchian, A. A. and Demsetz, H. (1972) Production, information costs and economic organization. American Economic Review, 62, 777-795.
5. Arrow, K. J. (1972) Gifts and Exchanges. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, Summer, 343-362.
6. Arrow, K. J. (1974) The Limits of Organizations. New York, London: W. W. Norton.
7. Austin, R. D. and Hoffer Gittell, J. (1999) Anomalies of High Performance: Reframing Economic and Organizational Theories of Performance Measurement. Mimeo. Harvard Business School. Harvard University.
8. Baker, G. P, Jensen, M. C. and Murphy, K. J. (1988) Compensation and incentives: practice versus theory. Journal of Finance, 43, 593-616.
9. Bardach, E. and Kagan, R. A. (1982) Going By the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
10. Barkema, H. G. (1995) Do job executives work harder when they are monitored? Kyklos, 48, 19-42.