Rational ignorance, rational voter expectations, and public policy: A discrete informational foundation for fiscal illusion

Public Choice

Volumn 107, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 35-64

  Congleton, Roger D ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035606501     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010337412291     Document Type: Article

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