On the durability of king and council: The continuum between dictatorship and democracy

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 193-215

  Congleton, Roger D ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347895223     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1011605310916     Document Type: Article

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