Separation of powers and political accountability

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 112, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 1162-1202

  Persson, Torsten ^a   Roland, Gérard ^a   Tabellini, Guido ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006037416     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355300555457     Document Type: Article

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