The political economy of government size

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 643-666

  Tridimas, George ^a   Winer, Stanley L ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ULSTER   (United Kingdom)

^b CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Coercive redistribution; Political influence; Probabilistic spatial voting; Size of government

Indexed keywords

EID: 23344438036     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2004.11.003     Document Type: Article

References (72)

1. D. Austen-Smith Interest groups: Money, information and influence In: D.C. Mueller (Ed.) Perspectives on public choice: A handbook 1997 Cambridge University Press 296-321
2. D. Austen-Smith Redistributing income under proportional representation J. Polit. Econ. 108 2000 1235-1269
3. R. Baqir Districting and government overspending J. Polit. Econ. 110 2002 1318-1354
4. W.F. Basset J.P. Burkett L. Putterman Income distribution, government transfers and the problem of unequal influence Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 15 1999 207-228
5. W.J. Baumol Macroeconomics of unbalanced growth: The anatomy of urban crisis Am. Econ. Rev. 57 1967 415-426
6. W.J. Baumol Health care, education and the cost disease: A looming crisis for public choice Public Choice 77 1993 17-28
7. G.S. Becker C.B. Mulligan Deadweight costs and the size of government J. Law Econ. 46 1998 293-340
8. T.C. Bergstrom R.B. Goodman Private demands for public goods Am. Econ. Rev. 63 1973 280-296
9. R. Bird The Growth of Government Spending in Canada 1970 Canadian Tax Foundation Toronto
10. K. Bjorvatn A.W. Cappelen Redistributive tax policies and inequality: An assessment of recent country comparative studies CESifo, DICE Rep. 1 1 2003 (Munich)
11. R. Boadway M. Keen Redistribution In: A. Atkinson F. Bourguignon (Eds.) Handbook of Income Distribution vol. 1 2000 Elsevier 677-789
12. T.E. Borcherding The cause of government expenditure growth: A survey of the US evidence J. Public Econ. 28 1985 359-382
13. T.E. Borcherding R.T. Deacon The demand for the services of non-federal governments Am. Econ. Rev. 62 1972 891-901
14. T.E. Borcherding J.S. Ferris A. Garzoni Growth in the real size of government since 1970 In: R.E. Wagner J. Backhaus (Eds.) Handbook of public finance 2004 Kluwer Academic Press Dordrecht 77-108
15. G. Brennan J. Buchanan The power to tax: Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution 1980 Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK
16. A. Breton Competitive governments: An economic theory of politics and public finance 1996 Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK
17. J.M. Buchanan R.D. Congleton Politics by principle, not interest: towards a nondiscriminatory democracy 1998 Cambridge University Press New York
18. J.M. Buchanan Y.J. Yoon Majoritarian exploitation of the fiscal commons: general taxes-differential taxes Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 20 2004 73-90
19. P.J. Coughlin S. Nitzan Electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and Nash social welfare maxima J. Public Econ. 16 1981 113-122
20. P.J. Coughlin D.C. Mueller P. Murrell Electoral politics, interest groups and the size of government Econ. Inq. 28 1990 682-705
21. P.J. Coughlin D.C. Mueller P. Murrell A model of electoral competition with interest groups Econ. Lett. 32 1990 307-311
22. A.S. Courakis F. Roque-Moura G. Tridimas Public expenditure growth in Greece and Portugal: Wagner's law and beyond Appl. Econ. 25 1993 125-134
23. A. Cukierman A.H. Meltzer A political theory of progressive income taxation In: A.H. Meltzer A. Cukierman S.F. Richard (Eds.) Political economy 1991 Oxford University Press 77-108
24. H. Demsetz The growth of government de Vries lectures, no 4 economic, legal and political dimensions of competition, North-Holland, Amsterdam 1982 99-125
25. A. Downs An economic theory of democracy 1957 Harper and Row New York
26. J.M. Enelow M.J. Hinich A general probabilistic spatial theory of elections Public Choice 61 1989 101-113
27. J.S. Ferris E.G. West Testing theories of government size: U.S. experience, 1959-1989 South. Econ. J. 62 1996 537-553
28. N. Gemmel Wagner's law, relative prices and the size of the public sector Manch. Sch. 58 1990 361-377
29. M. Gouveia N.A. Masia Does the median voter model explain the size of government? Evidence from the states Public Choice 97 1998 159-177
30. G.M. Grossman E. Helpman Special interest politics 2001 MIT Press Cambridge, MA
31. P. Harms S. Zink Limits to redistribution in a democracy: A survey Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 19 2003 651-668
32. W. Hettich S.L. Winer Democratic choice and taxation: A theoretical and empirical investigation 1999 Cambridge University Press Cambridge, MA
33. A.L. Hillman Public finance and public policy: Responsibilities and limitations of government 2003 Cambridge University Press New York
34. M.J. Hinich Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter is an artefact J. Econ. Theory 16 1977 208-219
35. M.J. Hinich M.C. Munger Ideology and the theory of political choice 1997 University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor
36. C.M. Holsey T.E. Borcherding Why does government's share of national income grow? An assessment of the recent literature on the US In: D.C. Mueller (Ed.) Perspectives on public choice. A handbook 1997 Cambridge University Press New York 562-591
37. L. Hotte S.L. Winer Political influence, economic interests and endogenous tax structure in a computable equilibrium framework: With application to the United States, 1973 and 1983 Public Choice 109 2001 69-99
38. T.A. Husted L.W. Kenny The effects of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government J. Polit. Econ. 105 1997 54-82
39. R.P. Inman M.A. Fitts Political institutions and fiscal policy: Evidence from the U.S. historical record J. Law Econ. Organ. 6 1996 79-132
40. J.B. Kau P.H. Rubin The size of government Public Choice 37 1981 261-274
41. J.B. Kau P.H. Rubin The growth of government: Sources and limits Public Choice 113 2002 389-402
42. L.W. Kenny The collective allocation of commodities in a democratic society: A generalization Public Choice 33 1978 117-120
43. L.W. Kenny S.L. Winer Tax systems in the world: An empirical investigation into the importance of tax bases, collection costs and political regime Carlet. Econ. Pap. 2001 (01-03, available at www.ssrn.com)
44. G. Kirchgässner The effects of fiscal institutions on public finance: A survey of the empirical evidence In: S.L. Winer H. Shibata (Eds.) Political economy and public finance 2002 Edward Elgar Cheltenham 145-177
45. L. Kristov P. Lindert R. McClelland Pressure groups and redistribution J. Public Econ. 48 1992 135-163
46. T.-M. Lin J. Enelow H. Dorussen Equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting Public Choice 98 1999 59-82
47. A. Lindbeck J.W. Weibull Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition Public Choice 52 1987 273-297
48. J.R. Lott Jr. L.W. Kenny Did women's suffrage change the size and scope of government J. Polit. Econ. 107 1999 1163-1198
49. A.H. Meltzer S.F. Richard A rational theory of the size of government J. Polit. Econ. 89 1981 914-927
50. A.H. Meltzer S.F. Richard Tests of a rational theory of the size of government Public Choice 41 1983 403-418
51. B. Milanovic The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: An empirical test with the required data Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 16 2000 367-410
52. G.M. Milesi-Ferretti R. Perotti M. Rostagno Electoral systems and public spending Q. J. Econ. 117 2002 609-657
53. D.C. Mueller Public Choice vol. III 2003 Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK
54. D.C. Mueller T. Stratmann The economic effects of democratic participation J. Public Econ. 87 2003 2129-2155
55. A. Peacock J. Wiseman The growth of public expenditure in the United Kingdom 1967 George Allen and Unwin London
56. A. Peacock A. Scott The curious attraction of Wagner's law Public Choice 102 2000 1-17
57. S. Peltzman The growth of government J. Law Econ. 23 1980 209-288
58. T. Persson G. Tabellini The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians Eur. Econ. Rev. 43 1999 699-733
59. T. Persson G. Roland G. Tabellini Comparative politics and public finance J. Polit. Econ. 108 2000 1121-1161
60. T. Persson G. Roland G. Tabellini Political economics and public finance In: A.J. Auerbach M. Feldstein (Eds.) Handbook of Public Economics vol. 3 2002 Elsevier 1551-1659
61. R. Ram Wagner's hypothesis in time-series and cross-section perspectives: Evidence from 'real' data for 115 countries Rev. Econ. Stat. 67 1987 194-204
62. K.W.S. Roberts Voting over income tax schedules J. Public Econ. 8 1977 327-340
63. J. Roemer Political competition: Theory and application 2001 Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA
64. T. Romer Individual welfare, majority voting and the properties of a linear income tax J. Public Econ. 4 1975 163-185
65. T. Rutherford S.L. Winer Tax policy in a computable model of economic and political equilibrium In: W. Hettich S.L. Winer (Eds.) Democratic choice and taxation 1999 Cambridge University Press Cambridge 153-192
66. N. Schofield Valence competition in the spatial stochastic model J. Theor. Polit. 15 2003 371-383
67. G. Stigler Director's law of public income redistribution J. Law Econ. 13 1970 1-10
68. G. Tridimas Budgetary deficits and government expenditure growth: Toward a more accurate empirical specification Public Finan. Q. 20 1992 275-297
69. G. Tridimas The economics and politics of the structure of public expenditures Public Choice 106 2001 299-316
70. D. Usher The welfare economics of the socialization of commodities J. Public Econ. 8 1977 151-168
71. A. Wagner Three extracts on public finance In: R. Musgrave A. Peacock (Eds.) Classics in the theory of public finance 1958 Macmillan London 1-16
72. B.R. Weingast K.A. Shepsle C. Johnsen The political economy or benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics J. Polit. Econ. 89 1981 642-664