From royal to parliamentary rule without revolution: The economics of constitutional exchange within divided governments

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 261-284

  Congleton, Roger D ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Constitutional evolution; Constitutional exchange; Credible commitment; Democracy; Dictatorship; Divided government; Division of power; King and council; Market for power; Public choice; Rise of parliament; Tax constitution; Veto players

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248633760     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.04.002     Document Type: Article

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