Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There

Handbook of the Economics of Finance

Volumn 2, Issue PA, 2013, Pages 211-356

  Murphy, Kevin J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Accounting; Corporate governance; Disclosure; Dodd Frank; Executive compensation; International pay; Regulation; Sarbanes Oxley; Stock options

Indexed keywords

EID: 84873485411     PISSN: 15740102     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-44-453594-8.00004-5     Document Type: Chapter

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