Why has CEO pay increased so much?

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 123, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 49-100

  Gabaix, Xavier ^a   Landier, Augustin ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 42149179178     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49     Document Type: Article

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