Corporate governance, compensation consultants, and CEO pay levels

Review of Accounting Studies

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 322-351

  Armstrong, Christopher S ^a   Ittner, Christopher D ^a   Larcker, David F ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Compensation consultants; Corporate governance; Equity incentives; Executive compensation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860565575     PISSN: 13806653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11142-012-9182-y     Document Type: Article

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