An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 27, Issue 7, 2003, Pages 1323-1348

  Anderson, Ronald C ^a   Bizjak, John M ^b  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate finance and governance; Regulation and business law

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038353971     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00259-5     Document Type: Article

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