Are U.S. CEOs paid more than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from risk-adjusted pay

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 402-438

  Conyon, Martin J ^a   Core, John E ^b   Guay, Wayne R ^c  

^a IE BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Spain)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79251529601     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhq112     Document Type: Article

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