CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: Evidence from Canada

Canadian Journal of Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 213-251

  Zhou, Xianming ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010106957     PISSN: 00084085     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0008-4085.00013     Document Type: Article

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