Golden handshakes: Separation pay for retired and dismissed CEOs

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 237-256

  Yermack, David ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746567946     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.01.001     Document Type: Article

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